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Abstract 
Gelman, S.A., and Wellman. H.M.. 1991. Insides and essences: Early understandings of the 
non-obvious. Cognition, 38: 213-244. 
Insides and essences are both critical concepts for appreciating the importance 
of non-obvious entities: neither are observable, both contrast with external 
appearances. and both can be more important than external appearances. The 
present research examined understandings of insides and essences in 3- to 5- 
year-old children. In Study I, children were asked questions requiring them to 
think about both the insides and the outer appearances of a series of objects. 
Zn Study 2, children were tested on their understanding that insides are typically 
more important than outer surfaces for an object’s identity and functioning. In 
Studies 3, 4, and 5, children were tested on their understanding of innate 
potential, a concept that reflects understanding of an inborn essence. Contrary 
to the traditional view of children as externalists (cf. Piaget, 195i), these studies 
demonstrate that by age 4 children have a firm grasp of the importance of both 
insides and essences. Even by age 3 children reason clearly about the inside- 
outside distinction. These results suggest that preschool children attend to non- 
obvious features and realize their privileged status. They may also indicate a 
more basic predisposition toward psychological essentialism in young children. 
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ntro ion 
In many ways adult cognition involves disregarding external appearances and 
instead penetrating to underlying realities, seeking deeper levels of analysis, 
and grasping (or inventing) non-obvious essences. This happens in everyday 
thought when we explain overt behaviors psychologically (by appealing to 
mental states, personality traits, and internal dynamics), when we categorize 
living kinds, such as mammals and birds, on the basis of non-obvious features 
(by appealing to their reproductive 4 genetic, and kinship relations), and when 
we go beyond observational appearances in countless other domains 
(acknowledging that the earth circles the sun, not vice versa, that fake 
diamonds are just glass, and so on). Attention to underlying, non-obvious 
realities also characterizes experts’ knowledge in a broad range of fields, 
including scientific theories, map making, medical diagnosis, and impres- 
sionist art. Indeed, imagine the phenomenal world of an organism that re- 
garded only external appearances - for example, an organism who under- 
stood people behavioristically, believed glass chips were diamonds, under- 
stood maps as merely decorated paper, or regarded having ieasles as nothing 
more than wearing red spots. 
One traditional and powerful view of young children, articulated in detail 
by Piaget (1951) and others, is that young children are remarkably like this 
hypothetical organism. They are, in other words, externalists. More precisely, 
children are described as incapable of reasoning about a broad cluster of 
understandings. On this view, until roughly age 6 or 7 children are artificialis- 
tic, assuming that natural or mechanical events are caused by people rather 
than by intrinsic or internal mechanisms (Piaget. 1929). They are thought to 
have difficulty reasoning about what they cannot see, such as internal 
mechanisms of the human body (Carey, 1985; Gellert, 1962); dreams, 
thoughts, and other mental states (Piaget, 1929); or non-obvious concepts 
that conflict with surface perceptions (Bruner, Olver, & Greenfield, 1967). 
This child-as-externalist position suggests that a wide range of inabilities or 
conceptual confusions are interrelated and follow from the tendency to focus 
on the observable to the exclusion of other properties. 
More recently, a number of findings in a variety of domains challenge this 
view, suggesting that children attend to non-obvious aspects of things well 
before school age (see Wellman & Gelman, 1988, for review). For example, 
by 3 or 4 years of age children have a sensible understanding of the mind 
(Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Wellman, 1990), of the appearance-real- 
ity distinction (Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 19C3), and of the importance of 
non-obvious properties for reasoning about categories (Gelman & Markman, 
1986; Gelman & O’Reilly, 1988). It has further been suggested that such 
understandings may serve as a mechanism for cognitive growth. 
In the present paper we examir, children’s understanding of the non-obvi- 
ous, looking closely at children’s beliefs concerning two inherently non-obvi- 
ous aspects of things: insides and essences. Our goal is twofold: first, to 
provide further evidence that the extemalist view mischaracterizes young 
children’s cognition: and second, to articulate more precisely what kinds of 
knowledge young children do have. 
Insides and essences 
Concepts of insides and essences represent two distinct yet related under- 
standings. Both insides and essences typically contrast with the outer appear- 
ance of an object. The insides of an item are the matter residing physically 
behind or under its outer layer (e.g., the bones, heart, and blood of a dog; 
the stuffing and wires of a chair). Insides are concrete and ultimately observ- 
able, yet typically remain unobserved. An essence is the unique, typically 
hidden property of an object that makes it what it is, without which it would 
have a different identity (e.g., the chemical composition of water, the DNA 
structure of an elephant).’ Essences generally are never observed, and in fact 
may remain unknown (consider, for example, the essence of life, or the 
essential nature of humans). Locke (1894/1959) characterized essences this 
way: “Essence may be taken for the very being of anything, whereby it is 
what it is.. And thus the real internal, but generally (in substances) unknown 
constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend may be 
called their essence” (p. 26). 
Both insides and essences are difficult to define precisely. Do a dog’s 
insides begin under the fur, under the skin, under the flesh, or indeed even 
interior to the skeletal framework? More troubling still, essences are typically 
unknown; those insensible parts or cores that enable or cause the sensible 
qualities of an object. Essences are often unspecifiable, and by their nature 
require an inference about some deeper organization or disposition. 
Nevertheless, adults certainly understand that objects have insides and out- 
sides and can distinguish the two. Similarly, adults often distinguish essences 
from appearances and seem to believe that many objects have an essence. 
Medin and Ortony (1989) for example, suggest that adults “act as if their 
concepts contain essence placeholders” (p. 186) - they believe that things 
have an underlying reality or true nature that cannot be observed directly. 
‘We are not making a metaphysical claim about the true existence of essences in the world. Rather. we 
are referring to “psyychological essentialism” (Medin & Ortony. IO). or people’s hdic:fs that things have 
essences. 
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For some objects, one kind of essence may be an internal part or substance 
(e.g., DNA structure); for other objects the essence may differ or remain 
unknown. 
Although clearly different, insides and essences have a special affinity. On 
the one hand, for many objects insides are more essential to their identity or 
functioning than are outer appearances. On the other hand, many purported 
essences, such as the genetic code of an animal and the chemical structure of 
elements, are internal or compositional in nature and so neither external nor 
perceptible. Nonetheless, insides are not synonymous with essences; essential 
similarities may also take the form of behaviors, functions, parentage, 
psychological make-up, or even intangible qualities (e.g., a soul). 
The inside-outside distinction seems a particularly promising vehicle for 
studying children’s emerging ideas of the non-obvious. Internal parts (e.g., 
the seeds of an apple, the heart of a dog) are concretely present in everyday 
. 
objects although intrinsically less obvious than outer surfaces. Children’s 
grasp of the inside-outside distinction could be a stepping-stone to under- 
standing a variety of non-obvious properties more generally. The insides of 
an object are often critical for its proper functioning (the spring of a watch) 
or for its appropriate use (the white and yolk of an egg). Even young children 
may grasp that internal parts or features can be more essential than outer 
coverings. Studies 1 and 2 focus on children’s understanding of insides. 
At first glance, essences would seem a more difficult concept than insides 
for children to grasp. Precise specification of a category essence certainly 
implies complex theoretical constructions. For example, an understanding of 
emistry is required to realize that the essence of water is H,O; an under- 
standing of biology is required to posit that the essence of a tiger is its genetic 
structure. Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, belief in some unspecified 
category essence may be frequent in adults and is possible even without such 
precise 3 scientific knowledge. Psychological essentialism - the psychological 
belief that certain kinds of objects or substances have something like a con- 
stitutive yet unknown essence - could thus also make an early developmental 
appearance. If it did, then such a belief could have important implications 
for children’s subsequent knowledge acquisition and categorization. Studies 
3, 4, and 5 of the present paper are designed to determine if and when 
children also hold the belief that categories encompass hidden essences. 
Study 1: The inside-outside distinction 
Recent work demonstrates that children are somewhat knowledgeable about 
the insides of familiar objects by age 3 years. If asked to report the contents 
of various objects they offer different answers for animate and inanimate 
things, typically reporting that animates have blood, bones, and internal or- 
gans (such as hearts or muscles), whereas inanimates have either nothing or 
have material such as cotton, paper, hair, or “hard stuff’ (Gelman, 1987). 
By age 4 years children assume that members of a particular category are 
likely to have the same internal parts and substance as one another, claiming 
for example that all dogs have “the same kinds of stuff inside” (Gelman & 
O’Reilly , 1988). 
Although these demonstrations are informative, they provide only a pre- 
liminary picture of children’s abilities. In particular, little work has examined 
whether children explicitly distinguish insides from outsides, and particularly 
whether they realize that insides can conflict with outer appearances. A crit- 
ical component to understanding insides is to reaiize explicitly that they mag 
differ from outsides. 
Understanding this “insideoutside distinction”, as we will refer to it, 
seems analogous to understanding the appearance-reality distinction. Even 
an organism that consistently apprehends reality faces grave difficulties if it 
confuses reality with appearance, or vice versa (cf. Flavell et al., 1983). When 
reasoning about the appearance-reality distinction, focusing exclusively on 
reality is an error referred to as “intellectual realism” (e.g., reporting that a 
sponge painled to resemble a rock not only is a sponge but also looks like a 
sponge). It is only when one can report that appearance and reality differ 
(e.g., “It’s a sponge, but it looks like a rock”) that one has a firm understand- 
ing of the distinction. 
The only previous research shedding light on children’s grasp of the inside5 
outside distinction was conducted by Gelman (1987). She asked 3-, 4-, and 
5-year-old children to describe both the insides and outsides of a range of 
animate and inanimate objects. She found that for animate things, subjects 
typically described insides and outsides differently (e.g., saying “skin” for the 
outside of an animal but “bones” for its inside). 
In Study 1 we investigate children’s understanding of the inside-outside 
distinction more directly. It is possible, for example, that in a task like 
R. Gelman’s children simply respond to the inside and outside questions with 
common associates, without comparing these two levels directly. Therefore, 
in Study 1 we included sets of pictures in which appearances and internal 
properties were placed in direct conflict with one another (e.g.. children had 
to reason about triads of pictures representing an orange, a very similar-look- 
ing orange balloon, and a lemon). These items can reveal whether children 
are capable of reflecting on both outer appearances and internal properties 
in the same task. Rather than simply describe the insides and outsides of 
objects taken one at a time, children were asked to match up two objects at 
a time in terms of either appearances or insides. In order to answer correctly 
about insides, children had to select two items that looked very different on 
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the outside as having the same insides (e.g., they had to 
and the lemon as having the same insides, even though 
more clearly resembled the orange balloon). 
Method 
Subjects 
select the orange 
the orange much 
Twenty-three j-year-olds (32 to 3;2, mean age 3:9) and 23 3-year-olds (44 
to S:2, mean age 4;8) participated. One additional j-year-old was tested but 
did not complete the session. In addition. 10 adults participated in a pretest 
of the items (see below). 
Each child saw the six sets of items listed in Table 1. For each set, children 
saw three pictures at a time, consisting of one target picture and two compari- 
son pictures. The sets were constructed so that appearances and category 
membership conflict. For example, on one item children saw a pig (target 
picture), a piggy bank, and a cow. The pig and the piggy bank look very 
similar, whereas the pig and the cow are both animals. As can be seen in 
Table 1, the target items were chosen to include two animals, two inanimate 
natural kinds (e.g., orange, nut), and two inanimate containers. All pictures 
were color photographs or realistic color drawings. 
A drrlt pretest 
The purpose of the pretest was to validate that the pairs of pictures selected 
to be perceptually similar were indeed viewed that way, at least by naive 
adults. Adults saw each of the six triads, one at a time, with the three pictures 
arranged in a triangle. For each triad they were asked to choose the two 
pictures that “looked most similar”. Performance was consistent with our 
predictions 90% of the time, which greatly exceeds chance performance of 
3X/o, t(9) = 703.0, p < .OOOl. 






glass of milk 
bowl of cereal 
Same appearance Same insides 
piggy bank cow 
stuffed dog sheep dog 
balloon lemon 
rock peanut 
glass of orange juice carton of milk 
bowl of soup box of cereal 
Procedure 
Children were tested individually in a small room apart from their regular 
classroom. The session began with a brief warm-up designed to clarify the 
task and remind children to think about both insides and outsides. In this 
warm-up children saw a pitcher of water with a handle and were asked 
whether the handle was inside or outside of the pitcher, and whether the 
water was inside or outside of the pitcher. On rare occasions when a child 
answered one of these questions incorrectly, he or she was corrected and 
asked the questions again. All children answered correctly at this point. 
The experimental session included a series of eight questions asked of each 
triad. The two focal questions required the child to match the target with one 
of the two comparison pictures: (I) Which comparison picture looks most Zike 
the target? (e.g., “Which of these looks most like the pig, the piggy bank or 
the cow?“); and (2) Which comparison picture has the same kinds of insides 
as the target? (e.g., “Which of these has the same kinds of insides as the pig, 
the piggy bank or the cow?“). Half the children were always asked the “looks 
like” question first; half were always asked the “insides” question first. In 
between the two focal questions, the “looks like” question and the “insides” 
question, children were asked to describe the insides and outsides of each 
picture in each triad (i.e., what do a pig, a piggy bank, and a cow “have 
inside” and “have outside”). 
Results 
Each of children’s choices on the focal “looks like” and “insides” questions 
were coded as either correct or incorrect, yielding a total score ranging from 
0 to 6 per question, or 0 to 12 across both questions. When responses to both 
questions were combined to yield a single score (out of 12), children per- 
formed significantly above chance (a score of 6, or 50%) at both ages (3-year- 
olds: M = 6.96, t(22) = 4.70, p c .OOOl ; 4-year-olds: M = 8.80, t(23) = 5.94, 
p < .OOOl). 
We then coded the number of same-category responses given to each ques- 
tion at each age (e.g., responses claiming that the pig and the cow - rather 
than the pig and the piggy bank - looked most alike or had the same insides). 
The results are shown in Table 2. The data were analyzed by a 2 (age: 3 
years, 4 years) x 2 (question type: looks like, insides) repeated-measures 
analysis of variance. There was a significant main effect for question type? 
F&45) = 51.95, p < .OOOl, as well as a question type by age interaction, 
F( 1,45) = 12.45, p c .OOl. These results indicate that overall children at both 
ages appropriately distingGched between insides and looks like probes, but 
the distinction became clearer with age. There were no other significant ef- 
fects. 
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Table 2. Study I, mean number of same-category re- 
sponses by age and question type (out of 6 
total) 
Inside Looks like 
Age 3 S.hl* 2.65” 
Age 4 4.17” 137w.3 
*Significantly different from chance. p < .Ol. 
**Significantly different from chance. p < .CK)ol. 
“The difference between responses to the inside and looks- 
like questions was significant at p < .05. 
Of particular interest in this study were children’s errors. We classified 
them into three types, based on Flavell et al.‘s (1983) work on the appear- 
ance-reality distinction. First, there were errors in which children relied too 
much on appearances, or “phenomenism” errors. Here, children said that 
objects that looked alike also had the same insides (e.g., the pig and the piggy 
bank). Second, there were errors in which children relied too much on cate- 
gory membership, or “realism” errors. Here, children said that the objects 
that had the same insides actually looked alike (e.g., the pig and the cow). 
Finally, children could show uninterpretable errors - answering incorrectly 
on both the insides and looks-like questions. As shown in Figure 1, children 
showed as many realism errors as phenomenism errors. In other words, ehil- 
dren’s errors did not result from simply focusing on perceptual similarity. 
ote that some of children’s errors (particularly phenomenism errors) would 
be very reasonable to make if children lack particular knowledge about the 
objects in question. (For example, a child who does not know what is inside 
a piggy bank may assume that pigs and piggy banks are internally similar.) 
Thus, children’s above-chance performance and their failure to give over- 
whelming numbers of phenomenism errors are all the more impressive. 
Descriptions of insides and outsides 
Children’s descriptions of the insides and outsides of each picture were 
transcribed. For each triplet, we coded (1) whether the insides attributed to 
the two different kinds of things (e.g., pig and piggy bank) were different, 
(2) whether the insides attributed to the two things of the same kind (e.g., 
pig and cow) were different, and (3) whether the insides attributed to each 
target item (e,g., bones for the insides of the pig) were different than the 
outsides attributed to that item (e.g., skin for the outside of the pig). In order 
for the descriptions to count as different, subjects had to supply two distinct 
and specific descriptions. We did not include in this tally any trials on which 
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3 Years 4 Years 
subjects said that they did not know what was inside or outside. A second 
person independently coded almost 20% of the items and agreed with the 
first coder on 90% of these decisions. 
The purpose of this analysis was to provide converging evidence for the 
claim that children distinguish insides from outsides. Do children reahze that 
the insides of objects can differ even when their surface appearances are striking- 
ly similar, and that the insides and outsides of the same item differ? In one 
sense this is an easier task than the judgment task reported earlier, because 
children were asked to consider only one object at a time. The present task 
can provide additional useful information, however, because chiIdren were 
required to name particular internal contents. Whereas the judgment data tap 
children’s knowledge that the insides differ, the descriptions can provide in- 
sight into their beliefs about how the insides differ. 
Table 3 presents the mean number of trials (out of 6 possible) on which 
chiIdren reported that: (1) the insides differed, for the different-insides pairs; 
(2) the insides differed, for the same-insides pairs; and (3) the insides differed 
from the outsides, for the target items. These data were analyzed by means 
of a 2 (age: 3 years, 4 years) x 3 (comparison: insides different (insides-dif- 
ferent pairs), insides different (insides-same pairs), insides versus outsides 
different (target items)) ANOVA. There was a main effect for age, F(I,45) 
= 6.80, p < .02, a main effect for comparison type, F(2,90) = 187.16, p < 
.OOOOl, and an age by comparison type interaction, F(2,90) = 5.72, p < .005. 
At both ages, children’s description of the insides of a single object typically 
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differed from their descriptions of the outsides of that object. bbreover, t 
descriptions were much more likely to differ when describing the insides of 
different kinds of things (e.g., pig and piggy bank) than when describing the 
insides of the same kind of thing (e-g., pig and cow). Findly. this last ieti;ect 
was slightly more pronounced in the older children. 
One way of comparing these results to those from the judgment task is to 
say that the pictures that looked alike were ty~~~~~Iy described as having 
different insides. Children readily overlooked misleading ~e~~e~t~al informa- 
tion when describing the insides. 
It is important to note in this analysis that Mdren did a.ot have to be 
accurate in order to appreciate differences appropriately. For example. a 
child could say that an orange ballmn has orange air inside and an orange 
has orange juice inside, or that an orange has orange skin outside and orange 
babies inside, and still be credited with appropriately reporting that insides 
are different in these cases. Indeed many incorrect responses occurred (e.g., 
rocks have nothing inside, peanuts have skin outside, a stuffed dog has blood 
but no bones inside, a soup bowl has tiny bowls inside, a balloon has little 
balloons inside) and many uninformative ones occurred as well (lemons have 
lemony stuff outside, piggy banks have colors outside, ever~)bhing has skin 
outside, a stuffed dog has stuff inside). These sorts of inaccuracies are impor- 
tant ior demonstrating that children do not require kno:vledge of particular 
insides in order to appreciate a general inside-outside distinction. 
Indeed, a fully knowledgeable and precise respormder might report that 
even those items that are ‘*the same kinds of things” do not have the same 
kinds of insides. For example, although pigs and cows are alike inside at a 
general level (both having blood and bones), they differ in the details of their 
physiology and anatomy (e.g., cows but not pigs have multiple stomachs). 
Accordingly, children’s successful performance on this task does not require 
having detailed domain-specific knowledge and reflects instead a more gen- 
eral appreciation of hidden similarities and differences. 
Table 3. Study 1. mean number of trials (out of 6 possible) on which srrbjects re- 
ported that the insides differed, as a function of pair type and age 
Comparison type 
_____ -__ 
Insides for different-insides pair 
Insides for same-insides pair 











ings from Study 1. First, ehildren at both 
s from outsides, even though the task 
pectives at once. In order to answer 
ems as having the same insides which, 
dged as noes looking alike. The second 
some difficulty ignoring appearances to assess 
at age 3. Importantly, however, they also had some dif- 
appearances. That is, when children 
no bias toward focusing on appearances: realism 
even for 3-year-olds. What improves 
with age in this study is an ability to deal with conflict between insides and 
outer appearances, not a shift toward understanding insides at all. Young 
children readily attended to non-obvious internal similarities even though 
they conflicted with surface appearances. 
Study 2: e insides essential? 
For adults an important aspect of understanding the inside-outside distinction 
is the realization that internal parts sometimes have a privileged status: they 
can be essential for defining an object or for its continued functionmg. At 
the very least, insides can 5~ relatively more essential than outer surfaces. 
Recent studies by Keil(1989) suggest that children may not have this appreci- 
ation till early elementary school age. His method was to descrrbe an object 
that changed in outer appearance only, and to ask whether that change con- 
stituted a change in kind. For example, a skunk was altered, through surgery 
and dye, to look like a raccoon while its insides remained unchanged. Pre- 
schoolers tended to report that the creature was now a raccoon; second gra- 
ders reported that the animal was a skunk that only looked like (“: raccoon. 
Keil’s studies are valuable for demonstr . - that, with devslopment, chil- 
dren become better able to focus on less OMOUS proper& for judging iden- 
tity. That is, success on Keil’s task certainly seems to require an understand- 
ing of the importance of non-obvious insides, and as they get older children 
perform increasingly well on the task. However, failure on the task cannot 
be taken as demonstrating a clear lack of understanding, because the proce- 
dure does not seem sensitive for uncovering the abilities of the youngest age 
group. 
One potential problem with the task concerns its reliance on questions 
about identity, and the relation of different criteria for determining identity. 
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Both insides and outsides can figure into an object’s identification and even 
into its conventionally agreed-upon identity, and it is often not clear how to 
resolve cases of discrepancy. For example. is a person who undergoes a 
convincing sex-change operation now a man. a woman. or some third kind 
of person? More generally. questions of identity (particularly borderline 
cases, such as the ship of Theseus; see Miilikan, 1984) pose knotty philosophi- 
cal conundrums that often have no clear intuitive (or psychological) solution. 
Insides can be essential to an object’s identity without being the only relevant 
quality. Young children might know this and still faii Keii’s task. 
A related concern is that it seems more difficult to judge which of two 
identities (raccoon or skunk) applies after changes have been made, than to 
determine that such changes inflrrerzce identity. It would be informative there- 
fore to question children about items that posed less of an identity choice, 
for example to include animals in which the outsides were altered in such a 
way that they did not resemble another known species (e.g., a dog with no 
fur) and to ask whetlzer identity was changed rather than what the identity 
was. 
Note in addition that Keii’s research failed to include items in which the 
animal’s insides were altered but the outsides remained the same (e.g., a dog 
with no blood or bones). This comparison could be crucial for gauging the 
relative importance of insides versus outsides for the young child. It is possi- 
ble that children believe that any kind of change affects an object’s identity- 
but that changing the insides is more important than changing the outsides. 
Subjects 
Children of two age groups participated: 17 4-year-olds (4;s to 4;11, mean 
age 4;7) and 14 Syear-oids (S;O to 6;2, mean age 5;7). There were approxi- 
mately equal numbers of girls and boys at each age. An additional two chil- 
dren (one at each age) were tested but completed only half the task, and so 
were not included in these analyses. 
Items and questions 
There were two kinds of test items: insides-relevant and insides-irrelevant. 
The insides-relevant items were ones for which the insides are critical to the 
identity and continued functioning of the object. Insides are not essential for 
all objects, so we selected items that would be clear-cut examples for adults. 
These included two animals (turtle, dog), two inanimate natural kinds 
(banana, egg), and three artifacts (book, pencil, car). As an example, the 
insides (yolk and white) of an egg are more critical than the shell for ordinary 
use of the item (e.g., cooking) or for its ordinary identification (without yolk 
and white it’s “just a shell” rather than an egg). The insides-irrelevant items 
served as contrasts and included three containers (jar, toy box, and re- 
frigerator), for which the insides (e.g.* the jam in the jar) do not affect the 
object’s identity and continued functioning. A realistic color drawing was 
used for each item. 
We asked questions about both the insides and outsides of both the insides- 
relevant and insides-irrelevant items. In this, we proposed to the child three 
sorts of transformations and then asked the child whether each transforma- 
tion of the item would change its identity and also an aspect of its ordinary 
functioning. More specifically, for each object children were asked to con- 
sider the following: 
(a) hide removal (“What if you take out the stuff inside of the dog, you 
know, the blood and bones and things like that and got rid of it and all 
you have left are the outsides?“). 
(S) Outside removal (“What if you take off the stuff outside of the dog, you 
know, the fur and got rid of it and all you have left are the insides?“). 
(c) Movement (e.g., “What if the dog stands up?“). This transformation 
served as a control to determine whether children have a bias to report 
that any change will result in a change of identity, given our task. If 
children have such a bias then the movement transformation can provide 
a baseline of correct responding against which to compare children’s 
responses from the inside and outside removal questions. 
All transformations are listed in Table 4. Following each transformation, 
children were asked two questions, always in the same order. One question 
concerned the identity of the transformed object (e.g., “Is it still a dog?“); a 
second concerned how the transformed object would function (e.g., “Can it 
still bark and eat dog food?“). 
Note in Table 4 that for the outsides removal we took off only the outer- 
most veneer of the object (e.g., paint, fur). We did this because we wanted 
to propose clear contrasts between the object’s insides and outsides. If we 
had proposed taking off a deeper layer of “outsides” we risked taking off 
some essential insides. In this study we were concerned with whether children 
consider insides essential; we were not concerned with the exact point at 
which children draw the line between insides and outsides. Therefore, the 
outside removals were not included to t&t children’s understanding of out- 
sides, but rather to contrast with inside removal and test whether in such a 
clear contrast children consider insides (interior to the outermost surface and 
appearance of the object) critical. 
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put in has 
stands up 




drop on table 
put in has 
drag across room 
move to other side of 
kitchen 
Procedure 
Children were tested individually in a small room apart from their regular 
classroom. The same warm-up was used as in Study 1. For each item, children 
first saw a picture of the standard (e.g., a dog) and were told its identity (e.g., 
“Here’s a dog”), then were asked to consider the three transformations for 
that item, one at a time. For each transformation children were asked the 
identity and function questions. Thus, for each item, six questions were 
asked. The order of transformations (insides removal, outside removal, 
movement) was randomized across items and across children. For every trans- 
formation the two questions were asked in the same order: identity first, 
function second. Items were presented in one of two random orders, neither 
order beginning with a container. Approximately half the children at each 
age received each item order. 
Results 
We coded the proportion of trials on which each child said “no”, that an item 
would no longer have the same identity or function as before. That is, the 
scores represent the proportion of trials that children affirmed that the object 
had changed identity or function. Our primary analyses concern the inside-re- 
moval versus outside-removal questions. 
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Inside-removal versus outside-removal questions 
The results are presented in Table 5. Two analyses were conducted: one 
concerning the identity questions and one concerning the function questions. 
Identity. As evident in Table 5, correct responding to the identity ques- 
tions for inside and outside removals averaged 73-69% for insides-relevant 
items and 78% for containers, collapsing across the insides-removal and out- 
sides-removal questions. We conducted a 2 (age) x 2 (item type: inside-rele- 
vant items vs. containers) x 2 (question type: inside removal vs. outside 
removal) ANOVA on subjects’ percentage “no” responses. There were no 
significant effects for age. There was a significant main effect for item type, 
F(L29) = 65.32, p < .OOOl and a significant main effect for question type, 
F(1.29) = 17.89, p < .0002. However, both of these effects were subsumed 
under the expected significant interaction between item and question type, 
F&29) = 107.54, p < .OOOL As this finding indicates, children most often 
reported that identity changed when insides were removed from the inside- 
relevant items (e.g., when the insides of a turtle or egg were removed). On 
the relevant items, children considered insides more critical than outsides; on 
the containers, children considered both insides and outsides as irrelevant to 
the object’s identity. 
These findings for the insides-relevant items held up across all seven of the 
items tested. For example, correct performance on the insides-removal ques- 
tion (i.e., asserting that removing the insides does change identity) ranged 
from 81% for the egg to 65% for the car. Moreover, for each of the seven 
items, identity was judged to change more when the insides were removed 
than when the outsides were removed. Thus, the results appear to be widely 
generalizeable. 
Table 5. Study 2, mean percentage of responses affirming that identity or function 
changes (numbers in parentheses indicate mean percent correct) 




72 (72) 35 (65) 12 (88) 




92 (92) 29 (71) 15 (85) 
20 (80) 23 (77) 7 (93) 
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Function. As noted in the introduction, questions concerning identity 
might be especially difficult for adults as well as children. Therefore we also 
included questions about the objects’ ordinary, characteristic functioning. d4s 
shown in Table 5, correct responding was marginally higher to function ques- 
tions (80% correct overall, 82% for inside-relevant items and 79% for con- 
tainers) than to identity questions. More importantly, however, the pattern 
of results closely parallels the pattern from the identity question, reported 
above. Again we conducted a 2 (age) x 2 (item type: inside-relevant items 
vs. containers) x 2 (question type: inside removal vs. outside removal) 
ANOVA. There was a significant main effect for item type, F( 1,29) = 115.04, 
p < .OOOl and a significant main effect for question type, F(1,29) = 77.33, 
p, < .OOOl. Again, these m&n effects must be interpreted in light of the 
significant item type by question type interaction, F(1,29) = 161.47, p < 
.OOOl. These results demonstrate that children considered insides critical for 
object functioning, but only on inside-relevant items. On the containers, chil- 
dren considered both insides and outsides to be irrelevant. 
Individual item analyses reveal that the advantage of insides held up on 
every one of the insides-relevant items. Across the seven items correct perfor- 
mance on the insides-removal question (i.e., asserting that removing the in- 
sides does change the item’s chara$eristic functioning) ranged from 100% 
for the book to 87% for the turtle. And for each item, function was judged 
to change more when insides were removed than when outsides were re- 
moved. Again, this suggests that the results are broadly generalizeable. 
Movement q4estions 
We included the movement questions as a control, to assess whether and to 
what extent, in our task, children answer that any change affects the identity 
and functioning of an object. This seemed possible since our format was to 
propose a change to the child (e.g., the outsides are removed) and then to 
ask whether a change had resulted (e.g., “Is it still a, . . .?“). The movement 
transformations ask the child to consider patently irrelevant changes. The 
results are presented in Table 5. Overall, children were typically correct on 
these questions (89%). However, there was a slight tendency to answer that 
identity and functioning change with movement changes. To assess whether 
this tendency emerged under certain conditions more than others, the results 
were analyzed by means of a 2 (age: 4-year-olds, Syear-olds) x 2 (question 
type: identity, function) x 2 (item type: insides-relevant, containers) 
ANOVA. There were no significant effects. Overall, children knew that loca- 
tion changes were irrelevant to the identity and functioning for all items. 
The slight bias to report that change has occurred cannot account for our 
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primary results. Children claimed that inside removal changed identity and 
function much more often than thev claimed that movement did (72 vs. 12% 
for identity and 92 vs. 15% for function). More important still, in our prior 
analyses we compared children’s judgments about insides removal with that 
for outsides: children were significantly more likely to say that insides re- 
moval changes identity than that outsides removal does. In sum, children 
understand insides as essential to an object’s identity and functioning, and 
significantly more essential than the controls we included, namely, external 
parts and position. 
Discussion 
By age 4 years, children appreciate the special importance of insides for an 
object’s identity and how it functions. These results contrast with Keil’s (1989) 
findings, that children are misled by outer appear2nr~c until plpFpnt=y i-_- _-VU V-w ~1-1.1-1 
school age. It may be that we were able to access an earlier understanding 
because we included no conflicting perceptual cues. All information about 
the hypothetical objects of interest were given by verbal descriptions. These 
may have allowed children to focus on the relevant features (insides versus 
outsides) without being caught up by misleading perceptual details. 
A further difference between past work and the present study is that chil- 
dren were not simply asked to judge object identity. Even philosophers dis- 
agree as to what constitutes identity and what is sufficient to alter identity, 
and we had hypothesized that reliance on identity questions could have 
obscured children’s knowledge in prior research. However, children in the 
present study considered insides critical to both identity and functioning. This 
constitutes a strong demonstration of young children’s understanding that 
unseen insides can constitute privileged, even essential, qualities. 
nnate potential of animals 
Study 2 focused on an overlap between insides and essences, demonstrating 
that even for preschoolers insides are considere d essential to an object’s iden- 
tity and functioning. In the final studies we focus more closely on whether 
children have a grasp of essences even when they are not necessarily internal 
or spatially localizable. As noted in the Introduction, essences come in many 
varieties and may even be unknown. Psychological essentialism represents a 
belief that there are essences; it does not necessarily entail accurate knowl- 
edge about particular essences. 
We approach the issue of psychological essentialism by focusing initially 
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on innate or intrinsic categcry potential. For many living kinds, an individual 
can have a certain intrinsic potential even before it manifests that potential 
in any visible way. For example, a tiger cub has the potential to grow into 
something large and fierce, even though when born it is small and helpless. 
To explain developmental changes cf this sort. we as adults often appeal to 
something like an intrinsic category essence. In other words. all tigers have 
an underlying nature or essence that is responsible for how they grow. If 
children, too, believe that immature creatures have intrinsic potentials that 
are not yet visible but will become manifested over time, then this would 
constitute evidence of one kind of essentialism. the belief in an essential 
nature or a determining but non-manifest predisposition. 
To test this notion, we conducted a study that can be thought of as a 
“nature-nurture” study. On each of a series of items, children were told about 
an immature being, a baby animal that was brought up in an environment 
more suited to a different species. The question is how children believe this 
animal will grow. Will it show as yet invisible, undeveloped potentialities 
intrinsic in its category membership, or will it instead display the properties 
associated with its environment of upbringing’? 
Method 
Fifty 4-year-olds participated. Twenty-five children were in the conflict 
condition, divided into older and younger groups (younger: n = 12, 4;0 to 
4;7, mean age 43; older: H = l&4:8 to S;7, mean age S;O). In addition, there 
were two control conditions; samt upbringing control (n = 13, 4;2 to 5;0, 
mean age 4;4) and same category control (n = 12, 3;ll to 4;10, mean age 
4;4). Subjects in these control conditions were approximately the same age 
as the younger group in the conflict condition, to make certain that even our 
youngest subjects could pass these controls. 
Items 
Five picture sets were used (see Table 6) all with realistic color drawings. 
Each set included a newborn animal of one species and a group of adult 
animals of another species (e.g., a newborn kangaroo and a group of adult 
goats). The newborn always had fewer prototypical features than the adults 
of its own species. For example, the baby kangaroo was hairless, pink, had 
closed-lidded eyes, and was curled into a small ball. For each set, the newborn 
animal picture was smaller than the picture of the adults. 
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long or short ears? 
rather have carrots or bananas? 
striped or plain fur? 
neigh or roar? 
straight or curly tail? 
say “moo” or say “oink”? 
round or floppy ears? 
run away from or chase cats? 
havepouchornopouch? 
good at hopping or climbing? 
Procedure 
Children were tested individually in a small room. There were three condi- 
tions in this study, a conflict condition and two controls (same upbringing 
and same category controls). In the conflict condition, children first saw a 
picture of a baby animal which had few of the characteristics that the adult 
members of the species have. For example, they were shown a picture of a 
calf and were told that it was a cow. Children then learned that the baby had 
been brought up by another species (e.g., Edith had been taken to a pig farm 
when she was a baby, was cared for by pigs, and never saw another cow). 
Children were shown a picture of the environment of rearing when it was 
mentioned (e.g., a picture of the pigs on the pig farm). Both pictures - of 
the baby and of the contrasting context of raising - were left in view. The 
baby animal was always reared in the company of adults of a different species. 
For example, on the cow/pig item, children heard the following: 
“Now I’m going to tell you about a cow named Edith. Look, here’s a 
picture of Edith when she was a baby. Right after Edith was born, when 
she was just a tiny baby cow, she was taken to a farm that had pigs - lots 
of pigs. See, here are the pigs on the farm. The pigs took care of Edith. 
Edith grew up on the farm with all the pigs, and she never saw another 
cow. ” 
For each item set, children were asked four questions. The first two ques- 
tions were simple checks to make certain that children remembered the infor- 
mation we had given: What kind of animal was, for example, Edith, and who 
raised her? (In this example, the correct answers would be ‘“a cow” and 
“pigs”, respectively.) If a child answered either of these questions incorrectly 
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or incompletely, he or she was corrected. The next two 
for this study. and concerned how the animal wouId be 
question concerned a mature physical feature 
a grown-up, what did her tail look like: was it stmi 
Why?“). The other question concerned a 
Edith got to be a grown-up. what sound did 
did she say ‘oink’? Why?“). Importantly. neith 
answered by looking at the picture of the bab 
Edith did not include her tail. So children were asked out non-visible 
attributes of the target that would develop in the future. ildren were en- 
couraged to justify their answers to the last two questions for each item set. 
Preceding the five item sets, all children first received an easy warm-up 
item concerning a baby bear that grew up with other bears. Children were 
asked two questions about the bear after it grew up: would it like honey or 
ketchup, and would it be brown or purple_ 
Control coJzniriorrs 
The two control conditions were included to ensure that the properties we 
used were ones that children of this age could answer correctly when there 
was no conflict - for example, we wanted to be certain that children would 
say that ordinarily cows say “moo” and have straight tails. In the same cate- 
gorv control, children were presented with the picture of just the baby. and H 
were told that it was raised in t” l&c environment appropriate to that species 
(e.g., they saw Edith, a baby cow, and were told that she was raised by other 
cows) l n the same upbringing control, children were presented with the 
picture of just the environment of raising, and were told about a baby appro- 
priately raised in that environment (e.g., they were told about a hypothetical 
baby pig. Edith, and were shown the other pigs she was raised with). By 
including both control conditions, we could determine whether children knew 
not only that cows say “moo”, but also that pigs say “oink” and do not say 
“moo”. 
In all three conditions, the order of items (except for the warm-up) was 
randomiy determined for each subject. The order of the choices (e.g., “Did 
she have a straight tail or a curly tail?” vs. “Did she have a curly tail or a 
straight tail?“) were counterbalanced both within and between subjects. All 
sessions were audiotaped. 
Resdts 
We scored how often children answered in accord with innate potential or 
essence; the data are summarized in Table 7. Scores could range from 0 to 5 
per subject and question type (behaviors vs. physical features). 
Control conditions 
The first analysis examined children’s performance in the two control con- 
ditions to make certain that they could answer the questions accurately when 
there was no conflict, and that the behavior and physical feature questions 
were roughly equal in difficulty. The data were analyzed in a 2 (condition: 
category control, upbringing control) x 2 (question type: behavior, physical 
feature) repeated-measures ANOVA. Results indicated no significant main 
effects or interactions due to either condition or question type (all ps > .40). 
Overall, children were correct a mean of 4.26 out of 5 items (85%) in the 
control conditions, which is significantly above a chance expectation of 50% 
or 2.5, t(24) = 12.68, p < .OOOL Thus, the properties used in this study are 
ones that subjects of this age are familiar with and attribute to the appropriate 
species. 
Conflict condition 
The primary results concern how children perform in the conflict condition 
when innate potential is in conflict with the environment of rearing. As shown 
in Table 7. children in the conflict condition nearly always answered on the 
basis of innate potential. For example, they said that a baby cow raised 
among pigs will grow up to say “moo” and have a straight tail. To examine 
the effects of age and question type more closely the results were analyzed 
by means of 2 (age: younger, older) x 2 (question type: behavior, physical 
feature) repeated-measures ANOVA. There were no significant effects due 
to age. However, there was a main effect of question type, F(1,23) = 17.45, 
p < .0005. Children relied more on innate potential when the question con- 
cerned a behavior (e.g., what noise a cow will make) than a physical feature 
(e.g., whether a cow will have a straight tail). However, performance was 
above chance (50% correct or 2.5) in both ceils, p < .Ol. 
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Discussion 
The results of Study 3 suggest that children are essentialists, at least concern- 
ing how animals grow and mature. They assume that members of a category 
share something like an innate or intrinsic potential that will be realized even 
when an animal is reared by members of a different species. 
The results of the conflict condition cannot be due to some bias simply to 
prefer some response alternatives (e.g., moo and straight tail) over others. 
In the same upbringing control, when children were shown just the picture 
of the rearing environment (e.g.. pigs) and were asked about a baby raised 
in that environment, they appropriately predicted that that baby would, in 
this example, oink and have a curly tail after it grew up. More generally. in 
the control conditions children chose either alternative, as appropriate. 
A deeper issue concerns whether children’s answers reveal an understand- 
ing of non-manifest potential. or whether they simply reflect category associ- 
ations (e.g., because the experimenter called the baby a kangaroo, it must 
hop and have a pouch). One piece of evidence against this latter interpreta- 
tion is that children’s answers differed according to the question type - be- 
havior or physical feature. If children simply report category features or 
associations, they should do so equally for the two types of questions, but 
they did not. Children were more likely to grant the baby species-typical 
behaviors than species-typical physical features when it grew up, thus dem- 
onstrating that they considered each question separately and did not simply 
assume that the animals would have the properties normally associated with 
their names. We pursue this issue further in Study 4. 
Study 4: Inborn properties of animals 
In Study 4, children were asked which properties the infant animals of Study 
3 had when they were babies. If children tend to presume that babies do not 
yet have their adult features, that would support our interpretation of the 
answers in Study 3 in two ways. First, it would provide converging evidence 
that children do not answer just by reporting category associations. Second, 
it would indicate that children in Study 3 correctly expected properties to 




Twelve children ranging in age from 3;lO to 4;3 participated (mean age 
4; 1 j . Again we sampled younger 4-year-olds to be sure the data would repre- 
sent even the youngest children tested in Study 3. 
Items 
Each child was asked about the five baby animals used in Study 3 (see 
Table 6). For each, they were asked about four properties, the physical and 
behavioral features used in Study 3 (see Table 6) and also two new sorts of 
properties: inherent and impossible. Inherent and impossible properties serve 
as comparison items - the first are properties that all baby animals of the sort 
we included have from birth (e.g., legs, nose): the second are properties that 
members of these species never have (e.g., wings). 
Pi=ocedure 
For each item, the experimenter showed the picture of the infant (from 
Study 3) with no specified environment. Its proper name and species were 
identified, as in Study 3. Then children were asked the species name (as a 
memory check), followed by the four questions in random order. For exam- 
ple. on one item children were asked whether Edith (a cow) says moo (be- 
havioral property), has a straight tail (physical property), has eyes (inherent 
property), and has fins (impossible property). Each question was a yes-no 
question, e.g., “Does this baby kangaroo have a pouch?” The order of items 
was randomized separately for each subject. 
Results and discussion 
Children attributed the behavioral properties to infant animals 87% of the 
time; they attributed the physical features only 40% of the time, t( 11) = 6.20, 
p < .OOOl. Both kinds of properties were attributed more often than the 
impossible ones (mean of 7%) both ps < ,005, but only the physical features 
were attributed less than the inherent ones (mean of 88%) t(ll) = 7.73, 
p c .OOOl. That impossible properties were rarely if ever attributed to the 
infants shows that children’s answers do not just reflect a response tendency 
to answer “yes”. 
Note that in this study children attributed specified physical features to 
infant animals only 40% of the time, whereas in Study 3 they attributed thase 
same features to the same animal, when it grew up, 67% of the time, t(35) 
= 2.67, p < .02. This result provides critical evidence that children are not 
just reporting category associations. Physical features that are typically attrib- 
uted to the adult are typically not attributed to the infant. It is striking that 
subjects anticipate that properties not currently possessed by the infants will 
inevitably develop, and will do so even in an environment of upbringing 
encompassing very different appearances. This is precisely the sort of belief 
that is consistent with an intrinsic potential or category essence. The final 
point of interest is that the behaviors we used in Study 3 were seen as applying 
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to category members even as infants, and were thought to apply just as 
frequently as inherent body parts (such as eyes or tails). We cannot explain 
this difference between behaviors and physical features. but the impressive 
result with regard to physical features remains. 
Study 5: Innate potential of seeds 
One potential difficulty with Study 3 was that, in order to specify the innate 
nature of the animals, each animal was identified as a member of a certain 
species (e.g., children were told that Edith was a cow). This sort of species 
identification seems to imply an unchanging category membership which 
could bias children to attend to and report category associates (e.g., since 
cows have straight tails and say “moo”. then so does Edith). It now seems 
unlikely that such an alternative explanation could account fully for the re- 
sults, given the findings of Study 4. Nonetheless, Study 5 was designed in 
part to provide further evidence about this issue. In addition, we wished to 
extend our results beyond the domain of animals. 
The format of Study 5 was the same as Study 3, except that the questions 
concerned seeds instead of baby animals. There are several advantages of 
this procedure. One can specify the nature and hence the innate potential of 
a seed (e.g., a seed that came from an apple) without giving it an unchanging 
category membership (i.e., an apple). Furthermore, a seed looks nothing like 
the mature plant or fruit it eventually becomes, in contrast to infant animals, 
which share some perceptual features with their mature kin. A seed that 
came from an appfe is not an apple or an apple tree, nor does it resemble an 
apple or apple tree. 
Method 
Subjects 
Similar to Study 3, 25 4-year-olds participated, divided into two groups: a 
younger group (n = 12, 4;2 to 4;7, mean age 4;4) and an older group (n = 
13, 49 to S;d4, mean age 5;l). 
Items 
Seven sets of items were included (see Table 8). Each set included a seed 
of one species and a plant or set of plants of another species (e.g., an apple 
seed and a pot of flowers). All items were presented as photographs, primar- 
ily in color. 
Table 8. 
Seed Environment Question 
seed from apple 
seed from watermelon 
seed from lemon 
seed from flower 
seed from rose 
seed from grape 








apple or flower? 
watermelon or corn’? 
lemon tree or orange tree? 
flower or strawbern;? 
rose or dandelion? 
grapes or coconut tree? 
peach tree or plum tree? 
Procedure 
Children were tested individually in a small room. The session began with 
an easy warm-up question concerning a seed that came from a grapefruit and 
was planted with grapefruit trees. The remaining items posed a conflict be- 
tween the innate potential of the seed and the environment in which it grew. 
For example, children saw a seed that came from an apple and was planted 
with flowers in a flowerpot. All questions concerned object identity (e.g., 
“When that seed grew, what popped up out of the ground, was it an apple 
tree or a flower?“). To imply unchanging category memberships as little as 
possible, the identity of the seed was never explicitly stated (e.g., an apple 
seed), but we referred only to “a seed that came from an apple”. 
Here is an example of the exact wording that children heard: “This seed 
came from a watermelon. A girl named Jennifer took this seed out of the 
watermelon. Then she planted the seed in a cornfield. See, here’s the 
cornfield”. In the pretest, we additionally said that the child “watered that 
place and made sure it got lots of sunshine, and the seed grew and grew. Now 
I’m going to ask you some questions”. 
The order of items (except for the warm-up) was randomly determined for 
each subject. The choices (e.g., “Was it an apple tree or a flower?” vs. “Was 
it a flower or an apple tree?“) were presented in counterbalanced crder both 
within and between subjects. 
Results and discussion 
We scored how often children answered in accord with innate potential. 
Scores could range from 0 to 7 per subject. Given the two-choice answers, 
chance responding would be 50% or 3.50. The primary result is that there 
was a significant difference in performance between the two age groups, t(23) 
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= 1.90, p c .OS, one-tailed. The older children, as in the previous study, 
answered overwhelmingly on the basis of innate potential (M = 6.0 out of 7 
correct, t( 12) = 6.657, p c .OOiii j. Only one child in this age group (out of 
13) answered below the chance level of 3.5 items correct: indeed, over half 
of these children performed perfectly. In contrast, the younger children as a 
group performed at chance levels (M = 4.17, [(ll) = 0.725, ns.). 
Although the younger children did not score above chance, they did not 
appear to be simply guessing. When individual response patterns were 
examined, we found that all 12 of the younge r children answered consistently 
throughout the task. Specifically, seven children (58%) were correct on every 
item or all but one (out of 7), and five children (42%) were in error on every 
item or all but one (out of 7). 
There are two points to make from this analysis. First, it is noteworthy 
that more than half the younger children consistently based their answers on 
innate potential on this particular task. The seeds as depicted were completely 
unrelated to any mature exemplar (e.g., the seed from an apple in no way 
looked like an apple or an apple tree). To the contrary, the only visible 
exemplars were those of the environment (e.g., the flower plant was visible, 
but not an apple tree). Thus, in comparison to Study 3, an environment-based 
response in this study would seem even more compelling. The fact that half 
the younger 4-year-olds and almost all the o!der 4-year-olds could ignore the 
salient environmental cues and answer on the basis of origins is significant. 
The second point is that the younger children’s bimodal pattern of rcspond- 
ing suggests that around this age a change is taking place en&ling children 
to advance from consistent errors to a basically correct understanding. Al- 
though we can only speculate as to what is changing during this period, we 
suggest that children may be learning about the nature of seeds. In particular, 
it seems likely that children are learning that seeds are the immature versions 
of plants - that seeds are the plant “babies”, so to speak. Once children grasp 
that critical fact, then their understanding of innate potential can be applied 
to seeds as well as to young animals. Until that point, children may mis- 
construe the relation between seeds and plants (e.g., they may believe that 
seeds are plant food, or may simply know that seeds are found inside of 
plants), and so would have no reason to answer based on the seed identity. 
The primary finding, therefore, is that in a very different domain (seeds 
versus animal babies) and in a task where an even firmer grasp of innate 
essences seems to be required to generate correct responses, 4-year-olds pro- 
vided converging evidence of an understanding of non-visible, as-yet-unde- 
veloped intrinsic potential. 
One question these last three studies raise is when cinldren can be said to 
possess biological concepts, for example an understanding of biological prop- 
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erties of animals beyond a physical conception of their bodies and a 
psychological conception of their behaviors. The present findings suggest that 
children may have sensible biological understandings by age 4 years (see also 
Keil, 1989). Most strikingly, children’s appreciation of intrinsic properties 
(demonstrated in Studies 3 and 5) could be considered to reflect an initial 
understanding of something like genetics. In contrast, Carey (1985, 1988) 
argued that children do not initially understand biological concepts as biolog- 
ical, in the adult sense, but rather misunderstand such concepts physically or 
psychologically. For example, preschoolers consider “babies” to be behavior- 
ally limited versions of bigger animals, rather than their offspring. It may be 
that there are important beginnings of genuinely biological knowledge during 
this preschool period. Our findings are consistent with such a possibility but 
do not test it directly. 
General discussion 
The results from all five studies demonstrate that preschool children are not 
externalists, in contrast to the traditional view that their thinking is limited 
to phenomenal qualities. Instead, young children show an impressive ability 
to penetrate beneath surface appearances. These findings extend recent re- 
search showing that young children can sensibly describe the concrete insides 
of objects (Gelman, 1987) and expect categories to include features beyond 
those that are immediately perceptible (Gelman & Markman, 1986). Beyond 
this, we have shown that young children distinguish insides of objects from 
their outsides, even when the two conflict, and believe that insides can be 
more essential to an object’s functioning and identity. Moreover, we provide 
evidence for an early understanding of innate potential, whereby immature 
living things are thought to possess a native essence that influences the nature 
of visible attributes, of non-visible attributes, and even of attributes not yet 
present in any form. 
Throughout the paper we have introduced several related notions, includ- 
ing not only insides and essences, but also innate potential, inborn features, 
and intrinsic characteristics. At this point we wish to clarify how these con- 
cepts interrelate, and to what extent the present studies provide evidence for 
each. To undertake this discussion it seems useful to focus momentarily on 
living kinds (e.g., tigers) which have internal, inborn, and intrinsic features 
(see also Gelman & Kremer, in press). “Internal” features are those that are 
on the inside of the organism, as we discussed in the Introduction. By “in- 
born” we mean properties that are possessed at birth either congenitally or 
genetically (e.g., the whiskers of a tiger). “Intrinsic” properties are not neces- 
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sarily apparent at birth but are typical of adu ts and so typically acquired 
during an organism’s lifetime (e.g.. tigers are intrinsically large and fierce. 
but are not actually large and fierce at birth). Thus, intrinsic properties are 
part of the innate polenrial of the organism. although the features themselves 
are often not inborn. These distinctions are not scientific ones. but rather 
part of our adult commonsense understanding. Commonsensically, internal, 
inborn, and intrinsic properties are separable notions. An internal feature 
(e.g., the defective heart of a tiger) may be neither intrinsic nor inborn: and, 
as just mentioned, intrinsic features (fierceness for tigers) need not be either 
inborn or internal in any literal, spatial sense. Internal. inborn, and intrinsic 
features can all bt non-obvious and in some sense “essential”. 
The present studies examined children’s understanding that internal and 
intrinsic properties exist and are essential. With regard to children’s under- 
standing that non-obvious properties exist, we tested first whether preschool- 
ers understood that objects could have insides quite different from their ob- 
vious outsides. Three- and 4-year-olds know this. We tested second whether 
children understood that living things - animals and seeds - could have intrin- 
sic properties that are not inborn. Four-year-old children understand that 
babies and seeds have intrinsic properties - ones that are not apparent at 
birth but that inevitably manifest themselves over time. This, too, shows an 
appreciation for the primacy of non-obvious qualities. 
Beyond testing children’s understanding of the presence of non-obvious 
properties, we tested whether children consider them essential in the sense 
of specially important. We showed, first, that 4-year-olds understand that 
insides are often critical to an object’s identity and functioning. We showed, 
second, that 4-year-olds understand that essential aspects of an item’s identity 
( g e. ., whether it will be a watermelon or corn, whether it will have the 
physical features of a kangaroo or a goat) can be completely non-obvious 
before it matures. 
In addition to what they reveal about the conceptual understandings of 
4-year-olds, the present findings have implications for two interrelated issues: 
the course of development, and the concept of psychological essentialism. 
Course of development 
Although our data concern mostly 4-year-olds, an intermediate preschool age 
tested in all four studies, we also provide some initial developmental findings. 
Before the fourth birthday, children have a clear albeit imperfect grasp of 
the inside-outside distinction (Study 1). They realize that such a distinction 
exists, and they can reflect on it even when insides directly conflict with 
outside appearances. The distinction may serve as a concrete precursor to the 
more refined understanding of insides and essences apparent in the older 
children. 
Beyond the fourth birthday understanding in this area appears to be in 
part knowledge-dependent. Children’s grasp of essences is partly limited by 
their knowledge of specific classes of objects. In particular, note that children 
appreciate the innate potential of animal babies at an earlier age than they 
appreciate the innate potential of plant seeds (Studies 3 and 5). Similarly, 
children’s grasp of the privileged nature of insides (Study 2) rests on specific 
knowledge of the distinction between containers and insides-relevant items. 
Thus, children’s understanding of insides and essences can only be revealed 
*when they have some pertinent knowledge about the object in question (e.g., 
whether or not it is a container, or the nature of its developmental stages). 
Nonetheless, the range of items, categories, and tasks used in the present 
studies document that children’s grasp of insides and essences has significant 
generality. Our findings clearly demonstrate an early disposition to expect 
insides and outsides to differ (at least for relatively complexly structured 
items like turtles and eggs, if not rocks and water), and to expect some 
objects to have essence-like qualities. For example, although 3- and 4-year- 
olds are by no means accurate at identifying the specific insides of even 
common objects such as oranges and dogs (Study l), they firmly grasp that 
insides and outsides differ. Thus, children may have a general presumption 
that insides and essences exist, before they have much domain-specific knowl- 
edge about an item. We turn to this issue next. 
Psychological essentialism 
These findings stand on their own as demonstrating a grasp of the presence 
and importance of internal and intrinsic features by quite young children. 
Beyond this, however, the findings raise the question of whether or to what 
extent young children might not also be psychological essentialists. 
Recently Medin (1989) has proposed that adults’ concepts are framed by 
what he calls psychological essentialism (pp. 1476-1477): 
The main ideas are as follows: People act as if things (e.g., objects) have essences 
or underlying natures that make them the thing that they are. Furthermore, the 
essence constrains or generates properties that may vary in their centrality. . . . 
It is important to note that psychological essentialism refers not to how the 
world is but rather to how people approach the world. Wastebaskets probably 
have no true essence, although we may act as if they do. Both social and 
psychodiagnostic categories are at least partially culture specific and may have 
weak if any metaphysical underpinnings (see also Morey & McNamara, 1987). 
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If psychological essentialism is bad metaphysics. why should people act as if 
things had essences? The reason is that it may prove to be good epistemology. 
One could say that people adopt an essenfialist herrristic. 
The notion of an essence is the hypothesis that objects possess constitutive 
natures that make them what they are, that such an underlying nature is 
distinct from but responsible for more obvious external features. Having 
stripes is not essential to being a tiger. but it may be the direct consequence 
of having a tiger essence. Positing that there are essences does not mean 
identifying what those essences are: in fact, essences are typically hidden and 
unknown. 
The notion of an essence underlying an object’s identity and character has 
been discredited in both philosophy and biology (Dupre. 1986; Maya, 1988). 
But Medin’s claim is that it remains a viable psychological phenomenon - 
that people tend to believe that objects have essences, even though that belief 
may be faulty. Medin argues that describing adults as psychological essen- 
tialists accounts for much of their performance on categorization tasks. Essen- 
tialism is a powerfully useful psychological disposition that directs adult in- 
duction and know’ledge acquisition (including the sorts of hypotheses we en- 
tertain and attempt to confirm). Medin suggests that such an essentialist 
disposition constrains our sense of similarity and can even have a revolutioniz- 
ing influence on it. 
It may seem premature to ask when and to what extent children become 
essentialists when it is still unclear whether adults arc. But we raise the 
question because psychological essentialism seems to be a plausible candidate 
for an important cognitive predisposition. Medin’s arguments about its useful- 
ness as a disposition in adult cognition can be extended to argue for the 
usefulness of such a presumption in knowledge acquisition, induction, and 
concept building in development. 
That is, we propose that something like an essentialistic disposition could 
propel knowledge acquisition and shape concept representation early in de- 
velopment - not just at the end. Consider children’s understanding of insides 
as revealed in the present studies. Why would such young children have a 
clear and distinct understanding that the insides of such varied things as 
pencils, turtles, and cars differ from their outsides? Although children may 
have considerable experience with these objects (e.g., having discovered that 
pencils make lines, can be sharpened if broken, etc.; that turtles have shells, 
walk slowly, etc.) that sort of everyday experience would not clearly yield an 
early understanding of their insides, nor an understanding that the insides are 
crucial to object functioning and identity. This sort of understanding of insides 
would be less mysterious, however, if children - like adults - are predisposed 
to believe that insides are different from outsides (see also Gelman, 1987), 
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and that insides are essential to an object’s identity and functioning. Ch& 
dren’s early grasp of the critical nature of insides is consistent with the view 
that early in the process of knowledge acquisition children are psychological 
essentialists. An essentialist disposition could help account for the burgeoning 
evidence that even young children construct considerable knowledge about 
the non-obvious (Wellman & Gelman, 1988), distinguish reality and appear- 
ances (Flavell et al., 1%3), and form theories to organize and go beyond 
phenomenal observations (Carey, 1985; Wellman, 1990). 
We believe that psychological essentialism is an attractive possibility for 
such a basic developmental cognition, though of course the present data do 
not provide a direct test. Our data simply document an early and impressive 
understanding of insides and essences. This leaves open the question of 
whether children’s knowledge, demonstrated here, is derived from accumu- 
lated past kiioxxledge, or whether instead manifests a belief brought to the 
task of acquiring knowledge. On the one hand, it is possible that children are 
acquiring numerous particular pieces of information about insides and es- 
sences - such as that pencils have lead inside, dogs have bones inside, apple 
trees are inherent in apple seeds, adult tiger behavior is intrinsic in tiger cubs. 
That is, a disposition toward essentialism in adults and, when it becomes 
present, in children may be the result of an accumulation of particular, ac- 
quired essentialistic beliefs of the sort studied here. If so, then the importance 
of the present findings is that they reveal the building blocks of an important 
adult acquisition. 
On the other hand. something like psychological essentialism may be an 
early, basic cognitive predisposition revealed in (rather than built upon) 
young children’s early understanding of insides and innate potentials. If SO, 
then findings such as ours might have an even greater developmental signif- 
icance, because such a basic disposition would have formative consequences. 
We favor this second alternative, because in the present studies children 
seem prone to believe that insides are important even when knowing little 
about the insides in question. They also seem prone to believe that babies 
(or seeds) may have intrinsic properties even when knowing little about 
specific babies or seeds. Either alternative, however - that something like 
psychological essentialism emerges developmentally or that it frames knowl- 
edge acquisition developmentally - further underlines the importance of re- 
search on children’s early developing notions of insides and essences. 
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